Dr. Adam Mount: Conventional Deterrence of Nuclear Weapons Use

​Dr. Adam Mount will discuss his International Security article "Conventional Deterrence of Nuclear Use." The article surveys recent technological developments, shifts in deterrence policy, and the results of twenty "tabletop interviews" with former senior U.S. officials who might plausibly have been consulted on a decision about how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. While the academic and policy literature cast doubt on the efficacy of conventional deterrence, the results explain why U.S. officials increasingly consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a viable and valuable capability.

​Some academic literature and U.S. policy documents suggest that conventional deterrence is weaker than nuclear deterrence. But recent developments in U.S. policy suggest that conventional forces are assuming a larger role in deterring limited nuclear use. This article explores why and how U.S. officials may turn to conventional weapons to deter a nuclear attack. As conventional weapons are becoming increasingly capable of producing strategic effects in response to a nuclear attack, U.S. officials may be more likely to consider conventional deterrence as a credible option to deter those attacks. In some cases, U.S. officials are likely to prefer conventional options to avoid the costs, risks, and uncertainty of nuclear threats. To test the theory, the article presents the results of a series of individual, scenario-based “tabletop interviews” with former senior U.S. officials who might plausibly have been consulted on a decision about how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The results demonstrate that U.S. officials increasingly consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a viable and valuable capability.

​Adam Mount is an independent scholar who has studied U.S. nuclear strategy, conventional deterrence, and progressive foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists and the Center for American Progress, as well as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Georgetown University.